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Abstract 
This article approaches Malaysian politics from 1981 to 1996 in two ways. 
First it reviews important political events so as to capture the critical issues 
and political themes of four sub-periods of the 'Mahathir era'. Second, it 
interprets the consequences of the political struggles of the entire period in 
relation to major social and political developments in Malaysian society. For 
the latter part, the article considers such socio-political trends as the 
emergence of new political and bureaucratic alignments resulting from 
Mahathir's modernizing, industrializing and privatizing agenda; the 
centralization of executive power; authoritarianism; the formation of a 
stateecapital alliance; and, the tensions felt in Mahathir's shift from the New 
Economic Policy to Vision 2020.' 
Introduction 
If in these modern times one does not object in principle to thinking 
about any society in eponymous terms, then one could conceivably 
depict the past 16 years - since Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad 
became Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister in July 1981 - as the 
'Mahathir era' in Malaysian politics. There are at least three reasons 
why it may be substantively acceptable and not just convenient to do 
so, namely, that during that era, 
the transformation of the Malaysian political economy and society 
was profound; 
much of the politics was thematically dissimilar to that of previous 
periods; and 
Mahathir was a dominant figure in virtually all key aspects of 
social change and political contention. 
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Furthermore, if one does not object to a division of the Mahathir era 
into several phases, according to a characterization of 'public 
sentiment', it may be said that the first phase of the era began in the 
early 1980s with considerable exuberance on the part of Mahathir 
himself, coupled with considerable bewilderment on the part of 
most Malaysians. However, in the current phase (that is, the 1990~)~ 
it would seem that Mahathir's exuberance has been translated into 
heightened expectations of the future, which are shared by very 
broad sections of Malaysian society. But in between the initial and 
the current phases of the Mahathir administration - that is, during 
the period of the mid- to late 1980s - lay two phases comprising 
several years of political struggle notable for their breadth, unpre- 
dictability and turbulence. 
There are two central difficulties in reviewing the politics of the 
Mahathir era comprehensively in a short article. On the one hand, it 
would be a sterile chronicle that does not attempt a thematic 
interpretation of the events and conflicts, however disparate and 
unrelated some of them may seem to broader patterns and trends. 
On the other hand, the breadth and complexity of those conflicts 
make it risky to impose definitive interpretations without over- 
simplifying, over-rationalizing or over-determining what were 
chaotic and disorderly happenings in their time. 
As a small aid to resolving these two central difficulties, a sum- 
mary of major political events of that period, together with an 
indication of their principal outcomes and significance, is provided 
in Table 1, below. The list of events shown is not exhaustive, the 
brief characterizations of their outcomes and significance are 
contestable, and the methodological appropriateness of such a 
tabulation may even be questioned. But Table 1 may serve as a 
chronological guide for the non-specialist reader through the review 
that follows, and the interpretation that concludes this article. 
Perhaps at the outset, Table 1 may also serve as a reminder that the 
politics of the Mahathir period defy theoretically simplistic theses, 
such as the common assumption that inter-ethnic (that is, Malay and 
Chinese) rivalry alone supplies the only reliable parameters for 
understanding the character of Malaysian politics.' 
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Table 1: Political events, principal outcomes and significance, 
Malaysia, 1981-96 
Yeads) l~olitical event($ l ~ r i n c i ~ a l  outcome l ~ a j o r  significance 
1981 l~ussein I~aha th i r  becomes lcommencement of 
" 
l ~ e ~ u t y  President contest l ~ e ~ u t y  Prime Minister Ifactionalism 
1982 lgeneral election llst Barisan Nasional victory lannouncement of 
I 
- 
lled by Mahathir IMahathir's economic policies 
1983-84lconstitutional crisis Istalemate between lcentralization 
Onn retires lprime Minister Ireformism and liberalism 
Musa-Razaleigh UMNO IMusa wins and becomes lindications of UMNO's 
land PBS ' " land federal-state strains 
1984-861politically related INGO-based criticism of !spread of urban 
1984 
1984-85 
I lfinanciai scandals lthe executive bddle-class disaffection 
1985 l ~ e m a l i  incident lstate assault on Islamic group lresponse to PAS'S resurgence 
IMusa's resignation as IGhafar Baba appointed Idisaffection with Mahathir's 
2nd Musa-Razaleigh 
contest 
MCA crisis 
UMNO and royalty 
Musa wins again, Razaleigh 
replaced as Finance Minister 
Tan Koon Swan emerges 
1 1986 
of executive power 
deepening 
UMNO factionalism 
culmination of 
Deputy PrGe Minister I ~ e ~ u t y  Prime-hknister lleadership 
general election ~ M N O ' S  and DAP's triumphs IMahathir continues 
., 
lin power, inter-ethnic divide 
1987 
" " 
~UMNO Baru and Mahathirlstates with victories lof political strength 
1989 Isemangat 46 formed l~azaleigh leads lbasis of new coalitions 
1986-871formation of Team B IMusa-Razaleiah's ~ M N O ' S  factionalism peaks 
1988 
1988-89 
UMNO election 
'Operation Lalang' 
lroyalty I 
1993 ~UMNO election l ~ a w a s a n  Team victorv l ~ n w a r  becomes 
UMNO's deregistration 
judicial crisis 
continuing dissent against 
1990 
1991 
1992-93 
l ~ e ~ u t ~  Prime Minister 
1994 l~abah election IPBS'S narrow victory, hew federal-state relations 
challenge to Gahathir 
Team A's narrow victory 
mass arrests of opponents 
ltoppled by defections 
1995 laeneral election l~arisan Nasional's triumph, lsuccess of Vision 2020 
UMNO fully split 
following purge of Team B 
the end of Mahathirist 
formation of UMNO Baru 
impeachment of 
Supreme Court judges 
bv-elections in several 
- 
general election 
Vision 2020 unveiled 
assault by member of 
'liberalism' 
Team B dissidents 
excluded from UMNO Baru 
culmination of 
Mahathirist authoritarianism 
inconclusive tests 
Team B-in opposition 
Barisan Nasional's victory 
a new Mahathirist agenda 
royalty loses immunity 
1996 
in opposition 
'two-coalition system' and PAS'S 
return in Kelantan 
National Development Policy 
centralization of power 
" 
APU split 
UMNO election 
* .  
DAP's defeat 
Razaleigh and Semangat 46 
return to UMNO 
Mahathir and 
Anwar are unchallen~ed 
PAS threatened in Kelantan 
Anwar confirmed as Mahathir's 
successor 
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Phase 1,1981-83: 'Vision' and the Pursuit of Nicdom3 
Mahathir succeeded Hussein Onn as UMNO's (United Malays National 
Organization's) President and Malaysia's Prime Minister in July 1981. To 
a Malaysian nation that could still remember the paternalistic ways of 
the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the imperturbable 
manner of the second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, and the 
self-effacing demeanour of the third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn, 
Mahathir seemed to enter the office of the Prime Minister with a rude 
slamming of doors. Immediately in office, he initiated a well-publicized 
campaign of bureaucratic reform, diplomatic initiative, economic 
modernization, heavy industrialization and Islamization. 
At the time many observers wondered if that overall campaign 
merely signalled a difference in the style of administration and 
leadership, between the low-key graces of Hussein Onn and the 
high-profile impatience of Mahathir. But fundamentally, the 
campaign promised 'content' wi& far-reaching ramifications - a 
thorough diagnosis of the socio-economic challenges facing 
Malaysia; an urgent solution modelled after Japanese managerial 
methods; and a vision of an industrial economy. In short, the 
campaign marked the beginning of a Mahathirist plan to embark 
Malaysia on the path to 'Nicdom', the prosperous position occupied 
by the so-called 'newly industrializing countries' (NICs) of East Asia. 
From Mahathir's office came a series of catchy slogans which 
collectively set forth Mahathir's reformist drive, modernizing 
mission and Islamization, the best known being bersih, cekap dun 
amanah ('clean, efficient and trustworthy'), kepimpinan melalui teladan 
('leadership by example'), and penyerapan nilai-nilai Islam ('absorption 
of Islamic values'). At this juncture, Mahathir's politics could be 
described as a form of 'tutelary populism' which sought to join a 
purposeful mass mobilization to his own enlightened leadership. As 
if creating a pattern of ripples radiating from himself, Mahathir 
called upon UMNO, the Barisan Nasional, the bureaucracy, the 
private sector, and, eventually, the entire population (Malays and 
non-Malays) to change their ways, redefine their priorities and 
strengthen their commitment to the nation. He especially wanted to 
create a nation of workaholics out of Malaysians who were repeatedly 
urged to emulate the 'Eastern work ethic' which Mahathir believed 
was the basis of the economic success of the East Asian NICs. In a 
society where ethnic suspicions were not easily set aside, Mahathir (who 
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had previously been adulated by the Malays and feared by the Chinese 
as a 'Malay nationalist') strove to rise above ethnic partisanship partly 
by muting the inter-ethnic disputes which arose from time to time, and 
partly by setting an outward-oriented, Malaysian nationalist agenda 
best summed up by his 'Buy British last' and 'Look East' policies. 
As a measure of his success in becoming all things to all men, 
Mahathir managed to rally to his banner diverse dissidents and 
opponents, including Anwar Ibrahim of the Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM, or Islamic Youth Force of Malaysia) and Kerk Choo 
Ting of the Dongjiaozong (an organization leading the Chinese 
education m~vement) .~ As a measure of his broader political success 
Mahathir, for the first time, led the Barisan Nasional to an impressive 
victory in the 1982 general election. What was remarkable about that 
electoral victory was not that UMNO prevailed over its Malay/ Muslim 
opponent, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, or the Pan Malaysian Islamic 
Party), which had been expected, but that UMNO's main ethnic Chinese 
partner (the Malaysian Chinese Association, or MCA) regained a 
number of seats it had lost during the 1978 election to the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP), the leading opposition party which has always 
been rooted in the urban predominantly non-Malay constituencies. 
By 1983 Mahathir had also revealed the extent of his economic 
p~licies.~ There were three major components to them: 
a heavy industrialization drive; 
a 'privatization' programme; and 
a 'Malaysia Incorporated' orientation. 
The heavy industrialization drive - represented by a combination of a 
'national car' project (Proton), a steel complex (Perwaja), two cement 
plants (in Perak and Pulau Langkawi), and three motorcycle engine 
factories - drew its inspiration from the success of South Korea's 
state-led late industrialization programme in particular, and some 
equity participation and technology transfer from both Japanese and 
South Korean  corporation^.^ If the private sector in Malaysia was 
unprepared to risk massive investment in these unproven ventures, 
Mahathir was more than ready to implement them via the Heavy 
Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), which came under the 
direct responsibility of the Prime Minister's office. There were many 
criticisms of the financial burdens and economic viability of the 
HICOM projects, including those voiced from within Mahathir's 
administration (Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam's reservations 
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being the most important case in point). But Mahathir was insistent 
those heavy industries would bring spin-offs and linkages to the 
local economy, transfer technology from the advanced countries, 
and upgrade Malaysian technical, managerial and marketing skills. 
To his mind, Malaysia needed these benefits to emerge from the tech- 
nological dependence, industrial backwardness and relative economic 
and political powerlessness typical of underdeveloped countries. 
But if the state was made responsible for the heavy industrial drive, 
Mahathir introduced his privatization policy to reduce state expendi- 
tures and involvement in other areas of commerce and bu~iness.~ The 
Mahathir administration had inherited a state apparatus which had 
vastly expanded since the New Economic Policy (NEP) was promul- 
gated in 197'0.8 The bureaucracy employed a (non-military and non- 
police) workforce of 521,818 in 1983 compared with 139,476 in 1970, 
while total public sector expenditure increased from RM3.3 billion in 
1970 to RM35.4 billion in 1982. And whereas there were an estimated 
109 'public enterprises' in 1970, by 1980 there were 656. 
Ideologically this enormous state expansion was justified as the 
necessary corrective to market-influenced and historically generated 
Malay economic backwardness and inter-ethnic imbalances. In 
practice, diverse state bodies, economic development corporations 
and bumiputera 'trust agencies', as well as their subsidiaries and 
associated companies, became involved in practically all sectors of 
the economy. But because they were simultaneously regarded as 
'social enterprises', their deficits, debts and losses tended to be 
overlooked or absorbed by the state, and rationalized as the price of 
providing experience, employment and skills to the Malays in 
particular in order to attain the NEP's ethnically determined 
economic restructuring and social engineering goals. 
Mahathir was ambivalent about the virtues of state economic 
expansionism. On the one hand, he had been the ideologue of state 
intervention for the 'cons~ctive protection' of Malay economic 
interests. On the other hand, he had few illusions about the business 
acumen and the profibmaking ability of bureaucrats. With privatization, 
Mahathir sought to discipline the bureaucrats in business and to widen 
the scope for private investment in the economy. However, in later 
years more complex issues bound up with the privatization became 
politically contentious. The 'Malaysia Incorporated' policy, modelled 
after the so-called 'Japan Incorporated', signalled an attempt to 
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remould the relations between the public and the private sectors. 
Throughout the 1970s, when the NEP was earnestly implemented, 
each had regarded the other with suspicion; the public sector being 
seen as incompetent and unfair to non-Malay business, and the 
private sector being regarded as rapacious and uncaring about 
Malay economic weaknesses. But after more than a decade of earnest 
NEP implementation, the previous sharp dichotomy between a 
Malay-dominated public sector and a Chinese- (but also foreign-) 
controlled private sector no longer obtained. With state assistance, 
one of the goals of the NEP, the creation of a Bumiputera Commer- 
cial and Industrial Community (BCIC), had been partially attained, 
and now there was a substantial body of Malay businesses, some 
controlling key sectors of the economy. Under state regulation, some 
of the largest Chinese corporations, and most foreign investors had 
been obliged to restructure to accommodate (state and private) 
Malay equity and employment. So that his programme of moderniza- 
tion and industrialization would not be derailed by a continuing enmity 
between the state and capital, Mahathir meant Malaysia Incorporated to 
reorient bureaucratic and business attitudes towards each other. 
The period 1981-83 was for the most part easy for Mahathir. In just 
two years he had won his first electoral mandate as Prime Minister 
without much difficulty, and had set a national agenda that was 
persuasive even as it was novel. In comparison with previous Prime 
Ministers, he exuded a sense of personal dynamism, far-sighted 
leadership and an 'open' populist style of politics. However, towards 
the end of 1983 Mahathir faced his first political crisis. In August 1983, 
Mahathir, UMNO, and the Barisan Nasional-majority parliament 
aided by a virtual mass media silence, had quietly managed the 
passage of several amendments to the constitution. The key amend- 
ment required the Malaysian King, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
explicitly to give his assent to all acts of Parliament within fifteen 
days of their passage, failing which royal assent would be deemed to 
have been granted. This amendment appeared to be only a formality 
to prevent in law what had never occurred in practice, since none of 
Malaysia's constitutional monarchs had ever withheld royal assent. 
The amendment was Mahathir's move to pre-empt the possibility 
that either of the two most likely successors to the Malaysian throne 
might, upon accession, interfere with parliamentary legi~lation.~ 
Moreover, Mahathir probably conceived of trimming the royal 
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prerogative as a logical and legitimate part of his vision of transform- 
ing Malaysian society under a strong, popularly elected leadership. 
But in October certain veteran politicians from Mahathir's own party 
publicly denounced the amendment for its 'anti-royalist', if not 
'republican', implications. From then on the Malay royalty began to 
dra; emotional support from a large number of Malays who regarded 
the monarchy as, among other things, one of the most important 
symbols of the special position of the Malays. A crisis pitting a Malay 
executive against the Malay royalty ensued, which took the form of 
tense mass rallies in favour of one side or the other. The crisis 
broadened when the 'non-royalist' opposition took exception to 
another amendment which would permit the Prime Minister, instead 
of the Agong, to declare a state of emergency, This amendment, it was 
contended, smacked of authoritarian tendencies. For the most part, the 
crisis ended with a compromise in December 1993, when the Agong 
assented to the amendments while Mahathir agreed to pass further 
amendments more acceptable to the Malay royalty. While Mahathir 
appeared to have gained his most important objective of ensuring 
royal assent for future legislation, the battle between a Malay-led 
executive and the Malay royalty - which divided the Malay commu- 
nity and UMNO itself - was essentially stalemated, waiting to be 
replayed over other political issues. 
Phase 2,1984-86: Scandals, Dissent and Recession 
With this 'constitutional crisis' of 1983, Mahathir's salad days were 
over. Now came, broadly, two series of political crises involving not 
the apex of Malaysian society but very much its 'grassroots'. The first 
set comprised several financial scandals, namely: 
the dkbscle involving the Hong Kong-based Bumiputera Finance 
Malaysia Limited (BMF, a subsidiary of the state-owned Bank 
Bumiputera Berhad), leading to the loss of over RM2 billion and 
the murder of a senior BMF officer sent to investigate the BMF 
accounts; 
Q the losses associated with a state corporation, Maminco Sdn. Bhd., 
which had been used by the government to corner the interna- 
tional tin market with disastrous financial consequences; 
the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) and the Makuwasa 
Securities Sdn. Bhd., which involved a manipulation of share 
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allocations by the government to recoup some of the Marninco 
losses; 
the collapse of Pan-Electric Industries, which triggered a three-day 
suspension of the Singapore Stock Exchange and the Kuala Lum- 
pur Stock Exchange and resulted in the conviction and subsequent 
imprisonment of the then MCA President, Tan Koon Swan, for 
criminal breach of trust; and 
the run on several deposit-taking co-operatives (DTCs), many of 
which were headed by MCA leaders and other political figures.'' 
Between 1984 and 1986, with these scandals being revealed one after 
another, and with the reluctance of the government to 'come clean' 
on any of them, the Mahathir administration was besieged by 
opposition parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
veteran public officers and retired Prime Ministers, and investors 
and depositors, collectively demanding executive accountability for 
loss of public funds and the prosecution of high-ranking bureaucrats 
and politicians suspected of impropriety and corruption. 
In parallel with the financial scandals came a series of political 
difficulties and setbacks for the Mahathir administration, namely: 
the shock defeat in 1985 of the ruling Parti Berjaya-led Barisan 
Nasional government in Sabah by the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), 
which precipitated a two-year crisis in Sabah - complete with a 
failed coup by the ousted Chief Minister, Harris Salleh, and the 
leader of the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), Mus- 
tapha Harun; political violence in the state; and a tense stand-off 
between the Joseph Pairin Kitingan-headed PBS state government 
and the federal government; 
the resistance, gaining strength from 1984-86, to plans for the 
location and operation of Asian Rare Earth Sdn. Bhd., a radio- 
active waste treatment plant, first in Papan, and then in Bukit 
Merah, Perak - which was backed by a mass mobilization of local 
residents and domestic and international NGOs; 
the September 1985 'Memali incident' in Kedah - where a police 
attempt to arrest an Islamic teacher led to a violent clash between 
the former and the latter's supporters, resulting in 17 fatalities 
(including four policemen), 29 injuries, and 160 arrests; and 
the sudden resignation, in February 1986, of Musa Hitam as 
Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy President of UMNO on 
grounds of an irreparable rift between him and Mahathir.l1 
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The financial scandals cumulatively undermined the confidence of 
the urban, largely non-Malay, electorate in the integrity of the 
Mahathir administration. For this section of the population, which 
had substantially supported the Barisan Nasional in the 1982 general 
election, the many slogans and promises of reform had turned out to 
be hollow words. The political crises, including the constitutional 
crisis of 1983, exposed Mahathir's vulnerability on several fronts - 
among Malay 'royalists' in and out of UMNO potentially rallying 
around Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (former Finance Minister and a 
prince from Kelantan); the bumiputera Kadazans in Sabah; semi-rural 
Chinese residents in Papan and their NGO allies; PAS'S Malay/ 
Muslim supporters and Islamic dissidents; and, finally, a sizeable 
section of the UMNO loyal to Musa. 
Mahathir's political problems were compounded by the advent of 
an economic recession in 1985-86. After nearly 15 years of continuous 
growth, the economy contracted by 1.0% in 1985 and managed a 1.2% 
growth in 1986. There were at least three major components to the 
recession - a global collapse in commodity prices; a sharp rise in 
public, and especially foreign, debt; and a substantial decline in 
private investment. The commodities collapse had a tremendous 
overall effect on export earnings and state revenues. Export earnings 
had increased threefold between 1975 and 1980, and Malaysia's 
economic planners had forecast total export earnings of RM63.1 billion 
for 1985. The actual figure was only RM37.6 billion. Malaysia's public 
debt had risen in the 1970s as a result of deficit spending associated 
with NEP's implementation. But partly because of the expenditure on 
heavy industrialization and several large-scale infrastructural projects, 
and partly because of the appreciation of the yen against the US dollar 
following the G-7 Plaza Accord of 1985, total public debt which was 
RM34.16 billion in 1981 reached RM 87.06 billion in 1986. Private 
investment which had steadily increased during much of the 1970s 
and reached a high of RM13.35 billion in 1984, fell to RM10.23 billion 
in 1986. Foreign corporate investment alone fell from its peak of 
RM3.26 billion in 1982 to RM1.26 billion in 1986. 
Until August 1986, Mahathir and his Finance Minister, Daim 
Zainuddin (appointed to replace Razaleigh Hamzah in 1984) 
responded to the recession in two basic ways.12 First, they imposed a 
structural adjustment type of restraint on most public spending. The 
1985 federal government's development expenditure was RM6.76 
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billion, just over half the 1983 figure of RM11.19 billion. Increases in 
operating expenditure were held down mostly by means of a job and 
wage freeze. Other than HICOM, the public enterprises were 
subjected to tighter budget constraints, closer monitoring, privatiza- 
tion and even closure. The Mahathir-Daim regime of fiscal austerity 
and contraction in state expenditure badly affected many social 
groups. Unemployment rose from less than 5.0% in 1982 to 8.5% in 
1986. For the first time since the expansion of tertiary education 
under NEP, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Malay graduates were 
unemployed in view of the job freeze in the public sector. The 
prospect of bankruptcy was daunting for businesses dependent on 
state support and contracts, the most badly affected being smaller 
Malay companies. Reduced revenues made it difficult for the state to 
bail them out, and Mahathir and Daim reasoned that Malay businesses 
had to discard their 'subsidy mentality'. Senior bureaucrats suffered 
reductions in their allowances, while those managing public enterprises 
were publicly criticized for low productivity and incompetence, and 
asked to resign if they could not improve their performance. 
A second response to recession by Mahathir and Daim consisted 
of new measures for the promotion of investment. In July 1985, 
guidelines for foreign equity ownership in manufacturing were 
liberalized. In December 1985, the Industrial Coordination Act, the 
main legal instrument of regulation under NEP, was amended to 
make it easier for manufacturers to start new projects, expand 
existing capacity, or diversify their range of products. The Promotion 
of Investments Act was passed in May 1986 and offered additional 
tax incentives for manufacturing, agriculture and tourism. A New 
Investment Fund was launched to allocate funds at preferential 
interest rates for new projects in these three sectors. 
Despite the severe economic conditions and unfavourable political 
circumstances, Mahathir called for a general election in August 1986. 
By then the urban non-Malay electorate had largely been lost to the 
Barisan Nasional, and, in particular, its non-Malay component 
parties, the MCA and the Gerakan. Given the groundswell of urban 
and NGO disaffection with the Mahathir administration's handling 
of the financial scandals and the other political crises, a huge 
electoral gain was predicted for the DAP. It was also forecast that a 
resurgent PAS would inflict a significant defeat on UMNO in the 
rural Malay constituencies, perhaps aided by UMNO's internal 
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disunity which also seemed likely to affect the efficacy of the party's 
electoral machinery. It was widely rumoured that the DAP and PAS, 
their ideological differences notwithstanding, would observe a tacit 
electoral pact against the Barisan Nasional. 
However, the election only partially went according to forecast. 
The DAP secured 20% of the popular vote and won heavily against 
the MCA and Gerakan. But PAS performed miserably, winning just 
one out of 82 parliamentary seats against UMNO. In short, the 
election was decided by a number of factors: the manipulation of 
ethnic sentiment and tension by almost all parties in the months 
before the election; the Barisan Nasional's superior machinery; 
DAP's strong strategy; and PAS'S ineffectual electoral campaigning. 
For his part, Mahathir, in accordance with the medical approach to 
politics which he professed to adopt, had virtually given up what 
was lost (the urban non-Malay vote) to retain what was critical (the 
Malay heartland). The Barisan Nasional was returned to power with 
its customary two-thirds majority in parliament, but mainly on the 
back of UMNO's overwhelming victory against PAS. 
Phase 3,1987-89: Crises of Mahathirism 
Before August, those who still remembered Tunku Abdul Rahman's 
downfall following UMNO and the Alliance's heavy losses in the 
May 1969 election considered Mahathir's leadership itself to be at 
stake in the general election. Had UMNO performed badly against the 
PAS, Mahathir's position as party President would have come under 
intense questioning. Ironically, now that UMNO had triumphed, 
Mahathir's leadership came under attack from within the party. 
In September and October, Mahathir decided to 'hold the NEP in 
abeyance' in order to stimulate the economy. The NEP contained a 
basic bumiputera equity ownership requirement that was deemed by 
the Malay community to be essential for its economic protection and 
advancement, but the requirement was generally unpopular with 
domestic and foreign non-Malay investors. The 'NEP in abeyance' 
meant a suspension of that ethnic equity requirement for private 
investment, first for foreign investors, and, then, for mostly domestic 
non-Malay investors. ~ r ~ u i n ~  in the NEP idiom, Mahathir rational- 
ized that economic 'growth' had to take precedence over NEP's 
ethnically determined 'distrib~tion'.'~ The Malay community (like 
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the other communities) had suffered from the recession and the 
austerity measures imposed by Mahathir and Daim. Now its 
political, bureaucratic and business circles were divided by NEP's 
suspension. The exact alignments were complex, but roughly the 
larger and more successful Malay businesses, capable of weathering 
the recession somewhat better on their own, supported the move 
towards 'growth'. On the other hand, smaller Malay businesses and 
a high proportion of bureaucrats and public enterprise managers, 
rather more desperate for state interventionism and counter-cyclical 
measures, preferred the continuation of 'distribution'. 
The conflicts in Malay society - thrown up by the constitutional 
crisis of 1983, Mahathir's bureaucratic reformism and economic 
modernization of 1981-83, the recession and the austerity measures 
of 1985-86, and the suspension of the NEP in late 1986 - were 
increasingly mediated through UMNO, the 'party of the Malays'. 
There, ideological and policy divergences intersected with personal 
grouses and ambitions to produce a brooding dissension against 
Mahathir's leadership of the party and the country. Mahathir was 
increasingly accused of economic mismanagement, cronyism, 
autocratic behaviour, and the subordination of the party to the 
government in policy matters. By February 1987, Musa and 
Razaleigh, formerly bitter foes in the party's Deputy President 
contests of 1981 and 1984 (both won by Musa), had found common 
cause in an anti-Mahathir alliance ahead of UMNO's triennial party 
election in April 1987. Razaleigh would challenge Mahathir for the 
President's post while Musa would defend his Deputy President's 
position against Ghafar Baba (whom Mahathir had appointed to 
replace Musa as the Deputy Premier). Faced with an unprecedented 
challenge against an incumbent President, UMNO's cabinet 
members, elected representatives, party veterans, delegates who 
would vote at the April annual general assembly, and its youth and 
women's wings, were split into 'Team A' (led by Mahathir-Ghafar) 
and 'Team B' (headed by Razaleigh-Musa). 
Team A and Team e B  waged an all-out electoral war between 
February and April.14 On April 24, Team A won a very narrow 
victory. Mahathir defeated Razaleigh by 761 votes to 718, while 
Ghafar won by 739 to 699. The election for the 25 seats in the UMNO 
Supreme Council was likewise closely divided. Mahathir, who had 
pledged to remain as President even if he won by one vote, spurned 
the possibility of reconciliation by purging his cabinet of Team B 
members. In retaliation, a group of 12 Team B members (later 
reduced to 11) loyal to Razaleigh filed a suit in the High Court to 
have the April election nullified because a number of ineligible 
delegates had voted in the party election. 
Before this 'UMNO-11' suit could be heard in court, a new political 
crisis loomed. As a result of UMNO's devastation of PAS, and DAP's 
defeat of MCA and Gerakan in the August 1986 general election, the 
electorate had been ominously split along distinct rural and urban 
lines, roughly corresponding to Malay and non-Malay divisions (in 
Peninsular Malaysia, at any rate). During the early Mahathir 
administration, the level of inter-ethnic, that is, 'Malay-Chinese', 
bickering over NEP and linguistic-cultural matters was low enough 
that most disputes were managed without serious repercussions by 
the Barisan Nasional leadership. But the Barisan Nasional frame- 
work for solving inter-ethnic disputes was severely strained in the 
late 1980s by UMNO's disunity and the MCA's weakness. When, 
therefore, a series of inter-ethnic disputes arose between June and 
October 1987 - by commission or omission, by design or accident - 
UMNO's Team A and Team B, and MCA sought political salvation 
in 'Malay unity' and 'Chinese unity' respectively. And, finally, the 
Barisan Nasional's framework virtually fell apart when UMNO 
regarded it as a betrayal that MCA and the Gerakan should join the 
DAP and the traditionally dissident Chinese education movement in 
protesting a Ministry of Education exercise to appoint a number of non- 
Mandarin-speaking headmasters in Chinese schools. Inter-ethnic one- 
upmanship was brought to brinkmanship when UMNO's plan to hold a 
'mammoth rally' threatened to precipitate inter-ethnic bloodshed. 
On 27 October 1989, Mahathir, as the Minister of Home Affairs, 
launched a nationwide police operation, codenamed 'Operation 
Lalang', which resulted in the detention of over 100 people, and the 
closure of three newspapers accused of fanning inter-ethnic 
discord.15 The mass arrest of mostly opposition politicians, a handful 
of UMNO, MCA and Gerakan politicians, Chinese educationists, 
Islamic dissidents, and NGO representatives (many of this last- 
named group having nothing to do with the rising ethnic tension), 
was made under the Internal Security Act, which sanctioned 
detention without trial. With this sudden move, Mahathir quashed 
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the possibility of bloodshed, because, almost as a quid pro quo, 
Mahathir cancelled the planned UMNO rally. 
However, the UMNO-11 were undaunted in pushing their High Court 
suit. They had hopes that the Malaysian judiciary would uphold 
their cause, since it had in the mid- to late 1980s decided several civil 
suits against the government. In February, the High Court delivered 
a stunning decision when it declared UMNO to be an illegal party 
because of the existence of several unregistered branches which had 
participated in electing delegates to the April 1987 UMNO assembly. 
Accordingly the High Court ordered UMNO's deregistration. 
Mahathir declined to appeal the court decision. The Registrar of 
Societies rejected an immediate attempt by Razaleigh and his allies 
to revive UMNO, but allowed Mahathir to set up 'UMNO Baru' 
(New UMNO). But because they had only wanted to have the party 
election nullified to pave the way for fresh elections, the UMNO-11 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Mahathir was not about to have his political fate decided by an 
'independent judiciary'. During the tense period of 1986-88, 
Mahathir had periodically criticized the judiciary for demonstrating 
a bias against the executive. His public criticism of the judiciary had 
been occasioned by the executive's loss in several suits, primarily 
'political' ones brought by the foreign press, leading figures from the 
parliamentary opposition (Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh), and 
NGOs (Aliran and the Papan Anti-Radioactivity Committee). Just 
before the UMNO-11 appeal was heard, the Lord President of the 
judiciary was suspended, impeached by a Special Tribunal for 
misconduct, and dismissed from office in August 1988. When five 
Supreme Court judges tried to come to the Lord President's aid, 
they, too, were suspended and impeached by a second tribunal 
which led to the dismissal of two Supreme Court judges. With the 
Malaysian judiciary so engulfed, the widening gyre of the crises of 
Mahathirism soon came to a close.16 
In August 1988, the Supreme Court dismissed the TJMNO-11's 
appeal. The most recalcitrant of the Team B dissidents, having been 
excluded from UMNO Baru, founded a new opposition party, Parti 
Semangat 46 (Spirit of 46 Party), headed by Razaleigh. The original 
UMNO, founded in 1946 as the organizational expression of Malay 
unity, was now irrevocably split. From late 1988 to 1989, the Team A- 
Team B conflict, as well as the dissent against the Mahathir admini- 
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stration, was expressed in the form of several by-elections, between 
UMNO Baru and Semangat 46, and between the Barisan Nasional and 
a broad-based opposition. The by-elections had dramatic skirmishes 
and narrow victories but it was understood that the relative strengths 
of all sides would only be conclusively tested in the 1990 general 
election. Hence the most significant outcome of the by-elections was 
the shadowy emergence of two political coalitions in anticipation of 
the general election. Semangat 46 and PAS joined in one coalition, the 
Angkatan Perpaduah Ummah (APU, or the Muslim Unity Force). But 
the DAP would not enter a pact with APU so long as PAS was 
unwilling to drop its goal of an 'Islamic state'. Thus Semangat 46 and 
DAP, joined by a handful of smaller parties, formed a second 
coalition, the Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia (Gagasan). 
Phase 4,1990-95: The Allure of Vision 2020 
Razaleigh led APU and Gagasan, hoping thereby to transform the 
Malaysian political system into a 'two-coalition system'. When 
Sabah's PBS defected from the Barisan Nasional (which it had joined 
in 1986) to the Gagasan on the eve of the October 1990 election,17 
Razaleigh was confident that APU-Gagasan would be able to deny 
the Barisan Nasional its customary two-thirds majority in parliament 
if not oust the ruling coalition from power for the first time in 
Malaysian political history. 
Purely as a conjecture, that might have happened had the 1985-86 
recession' deepened into 1990. By 1990, however, the Malaysian 
economy had experienced three years of strong recovery. A com- 
bination of improved commodity prices, an expansion in manufac- 
turing export earnings, and an increase in private investment 
resulted in an average annual growth rate of 9.1%, and a lowering of 
the unemployment rate from 8.5% in 1986 to 6% in 1990. Mahathir 
could claim that the economic revival vindicated his policies and 
Daim's management - the austerity measures, promotion of 
investment efforts, privatization, and 'holding NEP in abeyance'. In 
the face of the economic performance of 1988-90, much of the dissent 
bred on scandals, recession and structural adjustment was laid to rest. 
The politics of the 1990 election was thus played out on terrain 
familiar and favourable to the Barisan Nasional's traditional reliance 
on UMNO's strength, and on the coalition's claim to be the bastion of 
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stability and development. When the electoral fervour settled, APU- 
Gagasan's expectations of severely denting the Barisan Nasional's 
hold on power were let down by Semangat 46's dismal performance. 
Its representation in parliament fell from 13 seats to 8, and though 
PAS gained an additional 6 seats, UMNO's position as the Barisan 
Nasional's bulwark was essentially unassailed. That the broad-based 
dissent of the 1980s had not entirely dissipated was shown by the 
PBS's retention of power in Sabah, APU's complete eclipse of UMNO 
in Kelantan, and the DAP's near defeat of the Barisan Nasional 
government in Penang. Despite these landmarks, Malaysia's political 
topography in 1990 was not essentially different from that of 1986: the 
Barisan Nasional was back in power with a two-thirds majority, UMNO 
was dominant, and Mahathir was in charge. 
The year 1990 had long been regarded in the Malaysian public 
imagination as a critical year ever since the NEP was promulgated in 
1970 and set to be implemented for 20 years. Of course, NEP's 
suspension in 1986 had altered things somewhat. Still it was widely 
assumed that the post-1990 period would see a new policy to guide 
Malaysia's long-term social and economic development. In February 
1991, having gained twin economic and political triumphs in 1990, 
Mahathir unveiled a blueprint for Malaysia's future that has since 
been popularized as Wawasan 2020, or Vision 2020.'' 
In terms of economic policy, much of Vision 2020 was a repack- 
aging of the policies of the early Mahathir administration - privati- 
zation, Malaysia Incorporated and industrialization. Ideologically, 
Vision 2020 retained many shades of early Mahathirism - a 'Malay- 
sian nationalism', a freer capitalism, a moderate Islamization, and a 
scripted populism. The earlier goal of Nicdom being virtually 
realized by 1990, Vision 2020's principal goal was Malaysia's 
attainment of 'developed country status' by the year 2020. In socio- 
political terms, Vision 2020 envisaged the emergence of a Bangsa 
Malaysia, or a Malaysian Nation, that would gaze outwards in 
common purpose rather than focus on internal differences. 
The NEP was supplanted by the National Development Policy 
(NDP). The NEP's commitment to an ethnic restructuring of the 
Malaysian political economy was not altogether abandoned, but the 
NDP assumed that the creation of a bumiputera commercial and 
industrial community had had substantial success, and that the 
future was based on wealth 'creation' rather than its distribution. 
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Even if it was not entirely new, Vision 2020 quickly gained a 
generalized acceptance within Malaysian society. That had not been 
the case with the NEP, which had been offered in the name of 
'national unity' but just as often generated inter-ethnic discord. 
When Mahathir's reforms, policies and favoured projects first 
appeared, they were sometimes greeted with scepticism. When 
privatization and deregulation were initiated, they met with 
opposition. But almost no one has greeted Vision 2020 with derision, 
and the post-1990 political debate found no trace of an alternative or 
competing agenda. Perhaps the 'grandiose' and 'universalizing' 
Vision 2020 fulfilled, and profited from, a long-felt need for a new 
social foundation for a post-1990 Malaysia - particularly after the 
traumas of NEP discord and the crises of Mahathirism. 
The years 1991-95 saw an intermittent replay of some of the politics of 
the 1980s. In 1992, an incident involving the assault of a hockey coach by 
the Sultan of Johore precipitated a variation of the constitutional crisis of 
1983. A unified UMNO that had already charged the Kelantanese 
royalty with interfering in politics to help APU to power in Kelantan in 
1990 used the incident to pass legislation removing royal immunity 
from certain legal suits and grounds for prosecution. This time around, 
the royalty was unable to rally its previous s~pport.'~ 
After 1990, UMNO established itself in Sabah and rallied anti-PBS 
forces in the state. Over the next few years, the party and the 
Mahathir administration wreaked vengeance upon the PBS for the 
latter's defection in 1990, and upon Sabah for maintaining a non- 
Barisan Nasional state government. Several PBS leaders were 
prosecuted for alleged corruption; others were detained under the 
Internal Security Act for allegedly plotting the state's secession from 
Malaysia. The PBS's cohesion was undermined by the defection of 
some of its leaders. The formation of splinter parties weakened the 
PBS's Kadazan-non-Muslim alliance which had kept the party in 
power since 1985. As with all states that had been willing to 
maintain an opposition government in Malaysia's political history, 
Sabah was systematically starved of federally controlled develop- 
ment allocations and investment. 
When state elections were called in early 1994, the PBS managed 
to hold on to its Kadazan base but won only by the sheerest of 
majorities. The result was insufficient to prevent the fall of Joseph 
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Pairin Kitingan's 10-year government because of the defection of a 
few PBS state assembly representatives to the Barisan Nasional. 
One far-reaching political development took place within UMNO in 
1993, when the reconstituted party held its first election. Clearly no 
one was in a position to challenge Mahathir's leadership. Mahathir 
himself did not want a challenge against his Deputy, Ghafar Baba, 
who had stood by him since Musa's resignation, yet Mahathir could 
not prevent it. Anwar Ibrahim, one of three elected Vice Presidents 
from 1987, so outmanoeuvred Ghafar that the latter was compelled 
to withdraw from the fray even before the assembly was held. 
Anwar's rise was facilitated by the formation of his so-called 
'Wawasan Team', comprising a set of younger candidates - Muhyid- 
din Yasin, Najib Tun Razak and Muhammad Muhammad Taib - for 
the Vice President's posts. And just as Anwar toppled Ghafar, the 
Wawasan Team swept the incumbents, Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi 
Junid, out of the top elected positions in UMNO. 
There was much instantiated speculation that money and corruption 
had exerted an enormous influence in determining the outcome of 
the UMNO election. The party itself carried out no investigation, or 
at any rate, none that was publicized. Nor was there much concern 
the 'Wawasan' slate carried a 'Team B' echo from 1987 and presaged 
another cycle of factional fighting. What occasioned considerable 
excitement was Anwar's rise. Ever since Mahathir had brought him 
into UMNO from ABIM in 1982, Anwar had been considered to be a 
potential successor to Mahathir. After the UMNO election of 1993, 
Anwar lost no time in professing his loyalty to Mahathir. Mahathir 
in turn appointed Anwar as his Deputy Prime Minister. None the 
less, the UMNO election raised the critical question whether the 
prot6g6 would turn challenger in the next party election of 1996. 
The year 1994 brought expectations of another general election. 
The Barisan Nasional's triumph was a foregone conclusion. The 
period 1991-94 saw continued high economic growth, Sabah had 
fallen to the Barisan Nasional, and the APU-Gagasan pact had fallen 
apart after 1990. Yet Mahathir postponed the election to 1995, thus 
breaking the four-year election cycle which had been the practice 
since 1978. When the general election was finally held in April 1995, 
the only intriguing question was whether DAP could build on its 
gains in 1990 to form an opposition government in Penang. 
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The 1995 Barisan Nasional campaign, the fourth under Mahathir's 
leadership, turned out to be its most successful. In Kelantan APU 
retained power but with a reduced majority. Elsewhere Semangat 46 
suffered further reverses and could no longer pose any serious threat 
to UMNO. For the DAP, the election turned out to be its greatest 
disaster. In Penang, far from winning the state election, it retained 
only one out of its 14 state assembly seats. Throughout the rest of the 
country the MCA and the Gerakan routed DAP in the latter's 
customary urban strongholds. 
There were two basic reasons for the DAP's defeat, notably its d6biicle 
in Penang. First, the urban non-Malay electorate had reconciled itself 
with the Mahathirist programme and was not about to exchange 
economic prosperity for the deprivation that would certainly be 
visited upon a 'Penang in opposition'. Second, against his own 
brilliant judgement, the DAP leader, Lim Kit Siang, seemed to have 
badly misinterpreted the 'spirit of the 1990s'. Ideologically, the DAP 
campaign offered nothing to counter the impact of Vision 2020. 
Instead the party continued in vain to resuscitate the dissent of the 
mid-1980s. But that part of the 'politics of the Mahathir era' had ended 
way before 1995. The DAP paid the price of looking forlornly to the past 
while its erstwhile supporters had already been sold on the future. 
With the passing of the 1995 general election, political interest 
returned to UMNO's 1996 election, and the question of Mahathir's 
successor.20 Rumours had been rife among journalistic and political 
circles of a rift between Mahathir and Anwar. In particular, it was 
frequently speculated that Anwar might be forced by his supporters 
to challenge Mahathir for .the party presidency. Both Mahathir and 
Anwar denied that there was a rift between them, but Mahathir left 
nothing to chance and pre-empted any possibility of a challenge to 
his leadership with the consummate skill that had kept him in power 
for so long. At the 1995 UMNO annual general assembly, the party 
delegates passed a resolution that the posts of President and Deputy 
President should not be challenged in 1996. In principle, one or more 
of the party's 182 divisions could still snub Mahathir in 1996 by 
nominating Anwar for President, whether or not the latter accepted 
the nomination. But in May 1996, Mahathir immunized himself against 
any embarrassment, let alone challenge, with an UMNO Supreme 
Council ruling that no nomination - other than Mahathir for President 
and Anwar for Deputy President - would be accepted. 
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Some observers had considered that Anwar had a firmer hold over 
the delegates to the 1996 UMNO assembly than Mahathir. Anwar's 
allies did win the presidency of the Pemuda UMNO (UMNO Youth) 
and of Wanita UMNO (the women's wing). But in fact the Wawasan 
Team no longer existed as a firm pact. Najib Tun Razak and 
Muhammad Muhammad Taib retained their Vice President's posts, 
but Muhyiddin Yasin, the one Wawasan Team candidate for Vice 
President from 1993 to remain a key Anwar ally, lost, and Abdullah 
Badawi recaptured the remaining post. Mahathir loyalists won 
strong control of the 25 elected seats in the Supreme Council. 
Mahathir's position was once again unassailable. In recent inter- 
views with international magazines, Mahathir frankly indicated that 
he had 'no timetable for retirement'. 
Conclusion: An Interpretation 
Given their range, depth and complexity, the politics of the Mahathir 
era may be said to exhibit many leitmotifs, including: 
the emergence of new social, political and bureaucratic configura- 
tions and alignments resulting from the Mahathirist agenda of 
modernization, industrialization and privatization; 
the centralization of executive power vis-d-vis other institutions 
such as the monarchy and the judiciary, and opposition state 
governments; 
authoritarianism and the repression of civil society as desperate 
forms of control of popular dissent; 
the changing class and ethnic divisions of Malaysian society, most 
visibly expressed in the formation of a new alliance between a 
reformed state and a reconstituted capital; and 
the tensions inherent in Mahathir's ideological shift from the 
premises of the NEP to the parameters of Vision 2020. 
It would be absurd to relate all the politics of the Mahathir era to 
these (or other) leitmotifs consistently and directly. Nor can all the 
above leitmotifs be necessarily subsumed under any single, 
overarching theme. It seems reasonable, however, to view much of 
the politics of the Mahathir era as the politics of social and political 
transformation attendant upon the Malaysian experience of late 
industrialization which took place under the Mahathir regime. 
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Between 1957 and 1969, the Malaysian political economy was 
maintained in its relative laissez-faire state, which was socially 
characterized by an ethnic division of labour (and wealth owner- 
ship) inherited from colonial times, and which proved to be 
politically explosive in May 1969. During the NEP decade of the 
1970s, the Malaysian state intervened massively in the economy to 
resolve what Mahathir himself popularized as the 'Malay dilemma' - 
that is, the palitical need to delay the country's progress in order to 
alleviate the relative backwardness of the Malay community. In the 
ensuing transformation of the Malaysian political economy, the state 
made considerable progress in reforming Malay and Malaysian 
society - principally by engineering a new class of capitalists, 
bureaucrats and professionals (the so-called Burniputera Commer- 
cial and Industrial Community). 
By the time Mahathir came to power, however, further economic 
progress seemed to him to be held back by the proliferation of 
unwieldy enterprises, and the rift between a Malay-dominated state 
and non-Malay-controlled capital. It fell to Mahathir's personal 
boldness and nationalistic impulses to unleash a programme of 
economic modernization, heavy industrialization and privatization 
as the path to Nicdom. Much of this Mahathirist programme was 
modelled after the East Asian experience of carrying out late 
industrialization under the direction of a strong state. Much of this 
programme, in Mahathir's view, also required a 'clean, efficient and 
trustworthy' leadership, combined with mass mobilization. 
For the combination of leadership and popular participation to 
work, Mahathir prescribed the transformation of social attitudes, 
characterized by the inculcation of a 'work ethic' and the infusion of 
modernist Islamic values (especially towards education, thrift, 
labour and piety). Such an attitudinal-spiritual-value transformation 
most directly and deeply affected the Malay community, because 
Mahathir - at first by design and then when compelled by recession - 
required of the Malay bureaucrats, professionals and business 
people that they should discard their NEP-bred dependence on state 
protection, preferential treatment and sponsorship. And when faced 
with the 1985-86 recession, Mahathir revealed his tenacity as a 
politician, his pragmatism as an economic planner, and his adapt- 
ability as an ideologue. It was indicative of his radical departure 
from any dogmatic commitment to the 'Malay dilemma' that he 
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gambled on NEP's suspension rather than its entrenchment. In the 
process, his and Daim's regime of structural adjustment intensified 
the fissures within Malay society, fissures which found their 
institutional expression in UMNO's factionalism of the late 1980s. 
If all this suggests a Mahathir very much in control of events, a 
good part of the control was in fact lost to the outpouring of popular 
dissent in the mid-1980s. The dissent issued from different quarters 
and was expressed through different democratic avenues available 
in the Malaysian polity - state election (Sabah 1985-86), general 
election (DAP's gains in 1986), local community organization (Papan 
and Bukit Merah), NGOs (the 1986 Anti-Official Secrets Act 
campaign), party election (UMNO in 1987), and the courts (1986-88). 
As Mahathir and his administration battled for political survival, the 
strong state that he regarded as being ideal for guiding economic 
transformation became, in his eyes, the essential instrument for 
repressing social and political dissent. 
Thus opened an authoritarian phase of Mahathirist politics in 
1987, as various democratic forms of opposition were progressively 
crushed, notably through the purge of the Team B dissidents, the 
mass arrests of October 1987, and the assault on the judiciary in 1988. 
The political ferment continued and ended during the 1990 general 
election, when the Semangat 46-led coalitions failed to alter radically 
the power structure controlled by the Barisan Nasional. 
During the 1990s, key features of the political economy which 
Mahathir inherited in 1981 were radically altered. Privatization, 
deregulation and economic liberalization penetrated areas formerly 
controlled by the state, especially physical infrastructure, utilities, 
higher education and health-care services. With the expansion of 
economic opportunities created by these changes and the high 
growth conditions, the NEP concerns with ethnic wealth distribution 
have mostly been dissipated. 
Socio-economic modernization has also taken on new meanings, 
such as a partial reversal in. language and edumtlm pdicies to boost 
the position of English as the language of commerce and industry, 
the corporatization of local universities, and the emphasis on human 
resource development to keep apace of the 'demands of the age of 
information technology'. Some of these measures provoked low- 
level ~ a l a ~  linguistic-cultural resistance to a perceived downgrad- 
ing of the status of the Malay language, but simultaneously eased 
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non-Malay grievances over ethnic quotas for tertiary educational 
opportunities and worries about the position of the traditional 
'independent Chinese schools'. 
During the 1990s too, nationalism has been imbued with strong 
market dimensions, chiefly the export of Malaysian capital to other, 
less developed countries. Pockets of opposition and dissent 
remained, such as many NGOs' criticisms of money politics, non- 
transparent privatization contracts, treatment of foreign labour, and 
even foreign policy. In other words, many old political problems 
found new economic solutions. Undoubtedly, there had been 
opposition to mammoth projects such as the Bakun hydro-electric 
project, local resistance to large-scale state acquisition of land for 
privatized projects, and urban squatters' organization against 
dislocations caused by an untramrnelled property market. But these 
pockets of dissent found no focus to galvanize them into anything 
like the opposition movements of the previous decade. Instead, the 
conditions of rapid industrialization, high economic growth and 
unprecedented levels of wealth facilitated the sweeping ideological 
triumph of Mahathirism, known by its official names of Vision 2020 
and the National Development Policy. By 1996, Mahathir had won 
back just about everything that he had lost in the mid-1980s: the 
power of the monarchy was trimmed in 1993, PBS was toppled in 
1994, and the DAP was humiliated in 1995. Finally, APU broke up in 
1996 and Razaleigh and Semangat 46 returned to UMNO. 
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